The Eighth Army next turned its attention to the reconquest of Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Bohol. These four islands constitute a strategic geographical unit commonly called the Southern Visayas. Within this smaller theater, however, the topography required the division of operations into two areas and, consequently, the plan for their liberation developed into two campaigns by separate task forces. The areas of these campaigns were separated by the steep mountain range that runs roughly along the north-south axis of Negros Island. To the west and northwest of this range lie Panay and Negros Occidental; to the east, Negros Oriental, Cebu, and Bohol. The mission of liberating Panay and Negros Occidental (Victor 1 operation) fell to the 40th Division with the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team attached. (Plate No. 98) The capture of Negros Oriental, Cebu, and Bohol (Victor II operation) was assigned to the Americal Division.
At the time these operations were launched in March and April of 1945 the Southern Visayas as a group were isolated from the rest of the Philippine Archipelago. American forces controlled most of the surrounding larger islands. To the north, Mindoro and the most important areas of Luzon were in American hands; to the south, the Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago had been invaded; to the west, Palawan had been captured; and to the east, Leyte and Samar were under the control of American forces. With all escape routes cut off by Allied naval and air superiority, the Japanese forces in the Southern Visayas were caught in a trap from which there was no escape.35
The Seizure of Panay
Panay was the first of the Southern Visayas to fall before the fast-moving onslaught of the Eighth Army. The 40th Division (less the 108th Regimental Combat Team) was withdrawn from operations on Luzon in the middle of March and placed under the control of the Eighth Army. This division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Rapp Brush, formed the nucleus of the assault task force, while the amphibious
[339]
Plate No. 98, Operations in Panay and Negros Occidental, 18 March-20 June 1945
[340]
phase of the operation came under Rear Adm. Arthur D. Struble, Commander of the Panay Attack Group.36
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
As in previous amphibious landings, the objective area was softened up by aerial pounding before the invasion by ground forces. Starting on 1 March, nearly three weeks before the assault forces were to land, Marine and Thirteenth Air Force fighters made almost daily aerial attacks on Panay, aiming at enemy installations and troop concentrations. Meanwhile, Allied naval forces harassed the enemy's overwater communications in Guimaras and Iloilo Straits.37
The task force departed from Luzon on 15 March and arrived off Panay three days later. After destroyer bombardment of the landing beaches, the assault waves landed near Tigbauan. As they waded ashore the lead troops were greeted by men of Colonel Peralta's guerrilla forces.
By evening of the first day, troops of the 185th Regimental Combat Team had advanced approximately ten miles along the coast to Arevalo in the direction of Iloilo. Only light opposition was encountered, most of the enemy having retreated north along the Sibalon River. By evening the second day, Mandurriao Airfield had been secured and the 185th Regimental Combat Team stood poised for an attack on Iloilo, the largest city on Panay.38
The attack was launched on the morning of 20 March and Iloilo was taken almost immediately. The Japanese garrison had beat a hasty retreat the previous night, after destroying approximately 70 per cent of the city.39 Before the landing, Colonel Peralta's guerrillas had virtually cleared the interior and coastal sectors of the island and had bottled up most of the Japanese garrison within the Iloilo area. As
[341]
the fleeing enemy units hurried north from Iloilo, to escape the American forces, they were met by guerrillas in defensive positions north of Jaro. The guerrilla strength was insufficient to stop the Japanese completely, however, and the enemy troops broke through the lines and continued their retreat.
Pursued by American and Filipino forces, the Japanese were systematically ferreted out of their retreats and eliminated. Cabatuan Airfield* was secured and by 22 March all organized enemy resistance on Panay had been crushed. Overwater and overland patrols by guerrillas, assisted by elements of the 40th Division, effectively reduced the isolated pockets along the north and west coasts. A small enemy garrison on Inampulugan Island was wiped out, while a landing party to nearby Guimaras Island found the Japanese had retired to the hills. The scattered enemy groups were gradually hunted down by guerrillas and American mop-up patrols.40
|
*This World War II airfield was called the CABATUAN AIRFIELD by the Imperial Japanese Army, which operated it during the war. It was named after the municipality where it was entirely located, Cabatuan, Iloilo, Philippines.
It was also referred to as Tiring Landing Field by others but this was an inaccurate name as the airfield had installations in adjacent Cabatuan barrios as well, not just in Barrio Tiring, Cabatuan. Another erroneous name was Santa Barbara Airfield, erroneous because the airfield was not located in the neighboring town. See Cabatuan Airfield General Douglas MacArthur and the U.S. Army were aware of many errors that in publishing these reports the U.S. Army disclaims any responsibility for accuracy. It is up to the users to correct mistakes (See Foreword), and this website is hereby putting the correct name of the airfield as CABATUAN AIRFIELD |
Meanwhile, the 40th Division prepared to move across Guimaras Strait to Negros Island. It was estimated that the relatively strong enemy garrison on Negros Occidental, consisting of the remnants of two divisions, would be able to prevent a rapid completion of the operation by the initial landing force of two regimental combat teams. Rather than withdraw units from other operations and cause a postponement of their scheduled dates of execution, however, it was decided to proceed according to the original plan. After the first landings, the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team would be made available to augment the forces of the 40th Division.41
The Attack on Negros Occidental
On 29 March the 40th Division, less one regimental combat team, crossed Guimaras Strait from Iloilo and landed at Pulupandon on Negros Occidental. There was no preliminary naval bombardment and the landing was made without opposition. The landing force pushed rapidly inland and the strategic Bago River Bridge was secured after a brief skirmish. Lack of initial resistance was largely due to the assistance of the strong guerrilla units of Colonel Abcede, which were instrumental in confining the enemy principally to the north and northwest coasts of the island.
Troops of the 185th Regimental Combat Team moved northward, crossed the Magsungay River in the face of intense enemy fire and began their attack on Bacolod.42 After destroying a portion of the city, the Japanese garrison had withdrawn to the north and east, leaving a small delaying force capable of only limited action. Bacolod and its airdrome were secured by 30 March, and the outskirts of Talisay were reached the following day. By this time it had become apparent that the enemy did not intend to defend the coastal areas but would make a strong stand in the rugged high ground of the north-central part of the island.43
The Japanese fought tenaciously at Talisay
[342]
but the town and airfield fell on 2 April. Silay, a small barrio to the north, was taken the next day. Meanwhile, the 160th Regimental Combat Team had moved into positions at Bacolod vacated by the 185th Regimental Combat Team in its drive northward. The primary objectives in Negros Occidental had been secured; the 40th Division controlled the most important section of the west coast, extending from Silay to Pulupandan, while the area south of Pulupandan was mostly in guerrilla hands.
The division's next attack was directed inland against the Japanese prepared defenses in the mountain ranges of north-central Negros. This eastward advance was rapid and opposed only by delaying actions of a minor nature. By 4 April, the only remaining enemy defense areas in Negros Oriental were the pockets in the central mountain range and the fortified town of Dumaguete.
On 8 April, the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team made an overwater movement from Mindoro to assist the 40th Division. Taking charge of activity on the left flank, it began a concerted attack against the enemy main defense line the next day. Japanese resistance to the 40th Division's advance increased with time, bearing out intelligence predictions that the thrust would encounter the enemy's main defenses.44 Following the first day's operations in the division's assault, it became evident that progress would be slow and tedious for the Japanese were well-entrenched in rugged terrain.
In spite of this vigorous opposition, the attacking forces advanced steadily as the Japanese fell back from strong point to strong point. During the latter part of April the enemy defense deteriorated more quickly; however, it was not until mid-May that operations in the hills were considered to have passed into the mopping-up stage. Even then, with close support from bombers of the Thirteenth Air Force and guerrilla reinforcements, the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team made but slow progress in the hill mass south of Fabrica. Isolated though they were, the Japanese in that area continued to resist until the cessation of hostilities on 15 August.
Reconnaissance elements of the division meanwhile swung around the north coast of Negros and advanced down the east coast almost to Dumaguete. Here they were met by a combat team of the Americal Division which had landed on 26 April as a part of the Victor II operation. In this eastern area no organized enemy resistance was found and, by the end of May, pursuit of these fleeing remnants was taken over by Filipino guerrillas. In the mountains southwest of Dumaguete, United States forces encountered strong Japanese defenses which were not overcome until the second week in June. On 9 June the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team received orders to relieve the troops engaged in Negros Oriental and garrison the island. It thereupon assumed the responsibility for all further operations on Negros.45
| 37 Eighth Army, Panay-Negros Occidental Operation, pp. 31-32. |
| 38 CG 40th Div. Report to TAG, "Victor One & Victor One Able Operations, 40th Inf. Div." G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 1 Jul 45 (S). Hereinafter cited as: 40th Div. Victor I Report. Eighth Army, Panay-Negros Occidental Operation, pp. 37-42. |
| 39 The Japanese retreat was explained by Capt. Sadoyoshi Ishikawa, Staff Officer of the 77th Brigade, 102nd Division: "Lacking adequate supplies of ammunition and equipment, the Japanese units were broken up and scattered soon after the American assault landing. Believing that direct combat would prove disastrous, an all-out clash with the Americans was avoided and the fighting limited to defensive tactics. This was particularly true in the mountain areas where the final stand was made." 10th Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Staff Study of Japanese Operations on Panay Island. |
| 40 G-3, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Operations, Mar 45; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1080, 22 Mar 45. |
| 41 ACS G-3 Memo to C/S GHQ, SWPA, 17 Mar 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 381/36-P (TS). |
| 42 Lt. Col. Shigekatsu Aritomi, Staff Officer of the 77th Infantry Brigade, Japanese 102nd Division, revealed that it had been planned to destroy all bridges on the route to Bacolod, but the rapidity with which the American forces secured them, plus the fact that the detonators of the explosive charges were mechanically defective, prevented their destruction. Continuing, Colonel Aritomi said: Since our supplies were cut off, our policy was to obstruct the Americans as long as possible and to destroy the airfields so that they would be useless to the Americans. We also planned to destroy all the bridges but failed in this. "10th Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Staff Study of Japanese Operations on Negros Island. |
| 43 Panay-Negros-Cebu Operations, pp. 27-35. |
| 44 G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions, Mar 45. |
| 45 Op. cit., Apr 45; 40th Div, Victor I Report; CO 503rd PRCT, Report to TAG, "Historical Report for the Operation V-1, 7 April-20 June 45, (503rd RCT)" G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 20 Jun 45 (S); CO 164th Inf. Report to TAG, "Operations Report, Cebu, Negros, 164th Inf." G-3, GHQ, SWPA Journal, 30 Jun 45 (S). |
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v1/ch11.htm
|
FOREWORD
The Reports of General MacArthur include two volumes being published by the Department of the Army in four books reproduced exactly as they were printed by General MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters in 1950, except for the addition of this foreword and indexes. Since they were Government property, the general turned over to the Department in 1953 these volumes and related source materials. In Army and National Archives custody these materials have been available for research although they have not been easily accessible. While he lived, General MacArthur was unwilling to approve the reproduction and dissemination of the Reports, because he believed they needed further editing and correction of some inaccuracies. His passing permits publication but not the correction he deemed desirable. In publishing them, the Department of the Army must therefore disclaim any responsibility for their accuracy. But the Army also recognizes that these volumes have substantial and enduring value, and it believes the American people are entitled to have them made widely available through government publication. The preliminary work for compiling the MacArthur volumes began in 1943 within the G-3 Section of his General Staff, and was carried forward after the war by members of the G-2 Section, headed by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby with Professor Gordon W. Prange, on leave from the University of Maryland, as his principal professional assistant. Volume II of the Reports represents the contributions of Japanese officers employed to tell their story of operations against MacArthur's forces. The very large number of individuals, American and Japanese, who participated in the compilation and editing of the Reports would make a complete listing of contributors relatively meaningless. Volume I narrates the operations of forces under General MacArthur's command from the Japanese attack on Luzon in 1941 through the surrender in 1945. While service histories have covered much of the same ground in separate volumes, no single detailed narrative of General MacArthur's leadership as commander of the Southwest Pacific Area has yet appeared. Chapters dealing with the reconquest of Borneo, plans for the invasion of Japan, and the Japanese surrender make a distinctly new contribution. Volume I Supplement describes the military phase of the occupation through December 1948, reporting events not treated elsewhere in American publications. Volume II on Japanese operations brings together a mass of information on the enemy now only partially available in many separate works. Collectively, the Reports should be of wide interest and value to the American people generally, as well as to students of military affairs. They are an illuminating record of momentous events influenced in large measure by a distinguished American soldier. Washington, D.C. January 1966 HAROLD K. JOHNSON General, United States Army Chief of Staff http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/ |
